113 of 175 blocks of the round 2 manuscript are new or changed since round 1; 98 of 160 blocks of round 1 no longer appear. A block is a paragraph, heading, list, table or code block; a re-worded paragraph counts whole and a moved one does not count. This compares the two submitted texts and is not the response letter.
New or changed blocks
[under "The problem."]
ZK-ML systems (ezkl, Orion, RISC Zero) let anyone prove neural network inference was correct — without revealing inputs. This enables private biometric verification (e.g., Worldcoin), on-chain AI oracles, and compliant ML auditing. But proving is slow, and its cost depends on architectural choices that are hard to predict: in our measurements real proving time ranges from $28$ s to $970$ s over the 7 trained networks we proved (Table 10).
[under "What we show empirically."]
Real proving time varies by more than an order of magnitude (28 s to 970 s) across the 7 trained networks we proved (Table 10). A width-matched comparison (Table 2 andTable 9) shows that this spread does not come from the ReLU-versus-$x^2$ choice: at identical widths the two have the same calibrated $\mathrm{logrows}$ (in all five skeletons, and in 45 of 50 matched pairs across the trained sweep). Differences come from layer type, width, and from ezkl’s range calibration, which raises $\mathrm{logrows}$ for unnormalized $x^3{+}x$ networks. We therefore report a negative result for the assumption that polynomial activations are cheaper to prove in ezkl. We also report that the zero-cost proxies we tested do not predict accuracy across activation families, that polynomial networks often fail to train, and that, under budgets set on calibrated circuit size, a joint accuracy-cost proxy does no better than NEAR alone.
[under "Why this requires NAS."]
Architecture search for ZK inference needs to trade accuracy against circuit cost, and cost estimates must be validated against the prover. We evaluate a cost model against ezkl calibrations of trained networks and evaluate six zero-cost proxies, plus a NASWOT variant, on a benchmark that includes polynomial and BN-free networks, where the standard proxies were not designed to work.
[under "Our contributions."]
1. **Cost model with a held-out evaluation** (Section 3, Table 14): a parametric model of assigned cells, fitted on 180 trained, calibrated networks and evaluated on 54 disjoint ones.
[under "Our contributions."]
2. **Measurements** (Section 5 andSection 6.7): a width-matched ReLU $\approx$ $x^2$ result replicated on untrained and trained networks, and the $x^3{+}x$ calibration effect.
[under "Our contributions."]
3. **Benchmark and proxy study** (Section 6): 474 networks, two seeds, per-architecture results released; proxy correlations with Holm-adjusted significance, confidence intervals, partial correlations, and analyses with and without failed networks and with a common training recipe.
[under "Our contributions."]
4. **Search under calibrated budgets** (Section 6): a protocol with a tuning/evaluation split; the joint proxy does not beat NEAR-only, and the cost model’s estimate removes most budget violations.
[under "Paper organization."]
Section 2 reviews ZK-SNARK cost and contrasts with MPC. Section 3 states the cost model and the proxy analysis. Section 4 introduces zkml-bench. Section 5 reports width-matched ezkl cost measurements. Section 6 presents empirical results. Section 7 surveys related work. Section 9 concludes.
[under "2.1 ZK-SNARK Circuit Cost Model"]
- **Linear layers**: each multiply-accumulate contributes about one assigned cell (fitted coefficient $\approx1$, Section 6), giving $O(w_{\mathrm{in}} \times w_{\mathrm{out}})$ cells per layer.
[under "2.1 ZK-SNARK Circuit Cost Model"]
- **Polynomial activations** ($x^2$): evaluated with multiplications and no lookup; the fitted per-element cost of the power operator is of the same order as ReLU’s (Section 6).
[under "2.2 Contrast with MPC Cost Model"]
CryptoNAS (Ghodsi et al. 2020) optimizes for MPC (garbled circuits). In MPC: linear layers cost $O(1)$ via secret sharing (effectively free), while ReLU requires oblivious transfer (expensive). In ZK-SNARKs, linear layers are *not* free: multiply-accumulates dominate the assigned cells at the widths we test (Section 5), so an architecture chosen to minimize the ReLU count need not be cheap to prove. We do not evaluate CryptoNAS itself.
[under "3. Cost Model and Proxy Analysis"]
# 3. Cost Model and Proxy Analysis
[under "3. Cost Model and Proxy Analysis"]
This section states what we can and cannot establish about ezkl circuit size. The claims are deliberately modest: AssumptionAssumption 1 is a structural statement and a parametric form; its quantitative content is tested empirically in Section 5 andSection 6, not proved.
[under "3.1 A Parametric Cost Model"]
## 3.1 A Parametric Cost Model
[under "3.1 A Parametric Cost Model"]
ezkl compiles an ONNX graph $G$ into a PLONKish circuit. Fix the quantization scale $s$ and the lookup range $R$ (both are chosen by ezkl’s calibration pass). Each node $v$ has an operator type $o(v)$, input and output tensor shapes, and attributes (kernel size, stride, padding, groups).
[under "3.1 A Parametric Cost Model"]
**Assumption 1** (Structure of the cost model). *For fixed $(s,R)$ the circuit layout (columns, selectors, lookup and permutation structure) is a function of the graph structure $(o(v),\text{shapes},\text{attributes})_{v\in G}$ only and does not depend on the weight values, which enter only as cell assignments. Define $C(G;s,R)$ as the total number of assigned cells (ezkl’s `total_assignments`). We use the parametric form
$$
C(G) \;=\; \sum_{v\in\mathcal{M}} \beta_{o(v)}\,\mathrm{MAC}(v)
\;+\; \gamma\,|\mathcal{M}|
\;+\; \sum_{v\notin\mathcal{M}} \alpha_{o(v)}\,\mathrm{el}(v)
\;+\; \varepsilon ,
$$
where $\mathcal{M}$ is the set of Gemm, MatMul and Conv nodes, with $\mathrm{MAC}=n_{\mathrm{in}}n_{\mathrm{out}}$ for a Gemm node and $\mathrm{MAC}=h'w'\,c_{\mathrm{out}}\,(c_{\mathrm{in}}/g)\,k_hk_w$ for a Conv node with output spatial size $h'\times w'$ and $g$ groups; $\mathrm{el}(v)$ is the number of output elements; $\beta_o,\gamma,\alpha_o\ge 0$ are coefficients; and $\varepsilon$ is an unmodelled residual.*
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[under "The problem."]
ZK-ML systems (ezkl, Orion, RISC Zero) let anyone prove neural network inference was correct — without revealing inputs. This enables private biometric verification (e.g., Worldcoin), on-chain AI oracles, and compliant ML auditing. But proving is slow: in our measurements, real proving time ranges from under a minute ($47$–$58$s) to over twenty minutes ($1340$s) depending on architectural choices that practitioners cannot currently predict.
[under "What we show empirically."]
Real proving time in our measurements ranges from under a minute to over twenty minutes depending on the architecture (Table 8). A width-matched comparison (Table 3) shows that this spread does not come from the ReLU-versus-$x^2$ choice: at identical widths the two have the same calibrated $\mathrm{logrows}$ and $x^2$ has at most $6\%$ more assigned cells. The spread in our sweep comes from layer type and width, and from ezkl’s range calibration, which raises $\mathrm{logrows}$ for $x^3{+}x$ networks. We therefore report a negative result for the assumption that polynomial activations are cheaper to prove in ezkl. Choosing DWS+ReLU over a standard CNN reduces single-run mock-proof time from $1119$s to $534$s at a cost of $6.6$ accuracy points ($75.0\%$ vs. $81.6\%$). The most accurate ReLU architecture we evaluated needs $\mathrm{logrows}{=}25$ ($2^{25}$ rows), and we recorded no mock-proof result for it.
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